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Louis Jones Jr. had the dubious
honor of being the first defendant
tried under the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"), 18
U.S.C. § 3591-98. The FDPA dictates that if the government intends
to seek the death penalty, it must
prove the existence of one or more
statutory aggravating circumstances
during the sentencing phase of the
trial. During this phase, the FDPA
allows the defendant to submit evidence relevant to eight statutory
mitigating circumstances, including
"other factors in the defendant's
background, record, or character or
any other circumstance of the
offense that mitigates against imposition of the death sentence."
As to aggravating factors, the jury
must unanimously determine that
an aggravating factor exists.
However, jurors individually decide
on mitigating factors; thus one or
more members of the jury may find
a mitigating factor. If the jury finds
at least one aggravating factor, the
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jury must decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors to justify a sentence of
death. The jury then recommends
by unanimous vote a sentence of
death, of life imprisonment, or of
"some other lesser sentence."
In his argument before the Supreme
Court, Jones takes issue not with
the validity of the FDPA itself but
with the trial court's jury instructions that could have led the jury to
believe that the lack of a unanimous
verdict for either life or death would
have allowed the judge to impose a
less severe sentence. The FDPA
states that if the jury recommends a
sentence of either life imprisonment
or of death, "the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly.
Otherwise, the court shall impose
any lesser sentence that is authorized by law." 18 U.S.C. § 3594.
Thus the statute, argues Jones, lim-
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its the options of the jury to a sentence of either life imprisonment or
death. Where the jury does not recommend either of these, the only
remaining option is to allow the
judge to determine "some other
lesser sentence" according to relevant law. Yet some crimes, such as
kidnapping resulting in death-the
offense committed by Jonesrequire a punishment of death or
life imprisonment; no lesser offense
is legally authorized. 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a).
This case raises the question of
whether the judge's instructions, the
instructions on the jury forms, and
the judge's refusal to clarify his sentencing obligations could have confused jurors about the consequences
of their recommendation. Specifically, the question is whether individual jurors who favored life imprisonment but were in the minority could
have concluded that their failure to
vote for death with the majority
would lead to a verdict lacking unanimity, thus allowing the judge to
impose a sentence less than life
imprisonment.

ISSUES
The Supreme Court must decide
whether it is reasonably likely that
the jury instructions in this case led
the jury to believe that its failure to
decide upon either life imprisonment or death would result in a
court-imposed sentence less than
life imprisonment and whether
Jones was entitled to a specific
instruction that federal law would
have required a court-imposed sentence of life imprisonment.
In addition, the Court must decide
whether the submission to the jury
of two aggravating factors relating to
the victim's physical and personal
characteristics, which the Fifth
Circuit found invalid, constituted
"harmless error," not requiring a
reversal of Jones' death sentence.

FACTS
On February 19, 1995, Louis Jones
Jr. kidnapped, sexually assaulted,
and bludgeoned to death Tracie Joy
McBride, a 19-year-old Army private
who had arrived only eight days earlier at Goodfellow Air Force Base in
San Angelo, Texas. The day before,
Jones' ex-wife had made a final
break with him. After repeatedly listening to a recording of this conversation with his wife and consuming
a substantial amount of alcohol,
Jones went to Goodfellow Air Force
Base where he believed his ex-wife
was on duty. Instead he found Private McBride, who bore a strong
physical resemblance to his ex-wife.
Jones was convicted of kidnapping
resulting in the death of McBride
and of assaulting Michael Peacock,
an Army private who had attempted
to prevent the kidnapping.
At the sentencing hearing, the government presented evidence on the
four statutory aggravating circumstances that it alleged: that Jones
had caused the death of McBride
while committing the offense of kidnapping; that in the commission of
the offense Jones knowingly created
a grave risk of death to one or more
persons; that Jones committed the
offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, and depraved manner involving torture or serious physical
abuse; and that Jones committed
the offense after substantial planning and premeditation. In addition,
the government submitted evidence
on three nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances: Jones as a future
danger to the lives and safety of others; McBride's young age, slight
stature, background, and unfamiliarity with San Angelo, Texas;
McBride's personal characteristics
and the effect of the offense on her
family.
Jones presented evidence to support
the following 11 mitigating circumstances: that Jones did not have a

significant prior criminal record;
that his capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired; that Jones committed the offense under severe
emotional distress; that Jones had
been subjected to physical, sexual,
and emotional abuse as a child; that
Jones served the United States well
in the Army for 22 years; that Jones
is likely to be a well-behaved
inmate; that Jones is remorseful;
that his daughter will suffer emotional trauma if he is executed; that
Jones was under substantial stress
at the time of the offense; that
Jones suffered from numerous neurological or psychological disorders;
and that other factors about his
background militate against the
death penalty.
Before the case was submitted to
the jury for sentencing, Jones asked
the judge to instruct the jury that
failure to reach a unanimous decision as to life imprisonment or
death would result in a judgeimposed sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
release. The reason for this request
was to ensure that the jury did not
think that the option of "some other
lesser sentence" would allow the
judge to sentence Jones to a sentence less severe than life. In addition, Jones requested an instruction
that would have required the jury to
return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole if any one of the jurors was
"not persuaded that justice demanded Jones's execution." The district
court judge rejected these proposed
instructions.
After explaining to the jury the
process of weighing the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the
judge instructed the jury to come to
a unanimous verdict as to one of the
three options-death, life imprisonment without the possibility of
(Continued on Page 274)
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release, or some other lesser sentence. The judge then told the jury
that a recommendation of either
death or life imprisonment without
the possibility of release required
the judge to impose the jury's recommended sentence. However,
instructed the judge, if the jury recommended some other lesser sentence, the court would be required
to impose a sentence authorized by
law.
The judge instructed the jury "not
to be concerned with the question
of what sentence the defendant
might receive in the event [the jury]
determine[s] not to recommend a
death sentence or a sentence of life
without the possibility of release.
That is a matter for the court to
decide in the event [the jury] conclude[s] that a sentence of death or
life without the possibility of release
should not be recommended." At a
later point in the instructions, the
court reminded the jury that "in
order to bring back a verdict recommending the punishment of death
or life without possibility of release,
all twelve of you must unanimously
vote in favor of such specific
penalty."
The judge gave the jury four verdict
forms with which to record a decision. The jury was to use Form B if
it "unanimously recommend[ed]
that a sentence of death should be
imposed." The judge further
instructed the jury to use either
Form C or D if it determined that a
sentence of death should not be
imposed because the aggravating
factor or factors did not outweigh
any mitigating factor or factors, the
aggravating factors or factors were
insufficient to justify a sentence of
death, or the jury was unable to
reach unanimity in recommending a
death sentence. The court then reiterated that the jury should use
Form C if it "unanimously recommend[ed] that a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of release should be imposed ... "

and Form D was to be used if the
jury "recommendled] that some
other lesser sentence should be
imposed."
While Jones had requested clarifying instructions, he did not expressly object to the instructions given
by the court or to the language in
the verdict forms.
The jury found that the government
had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of two statutory
aggravating circumstances: that
Jones caused the death of McBride
during the commission of the
offense of kidnapping and that Jones
had committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel, and
depraved manner. The jury also
made unanimous findings as to two
of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances: McBride's young age,
slight stature, background, and
unfamiliarity with San Angelo and
McBride's personal characteristics
and the effect of the offense on her
family. Members of the jury found
the existence of 10 of the 11 mitigating circumstances submitted by
the defendant and wrote in the
name of Jones' ex-wife as an additional mitigating factor. The jury
returned a unanimous verdict recommending death.
Jones appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United
States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232
(1998). The Court of Appeals rejected Jones' arguments regarding the
jury instructions given by the district court as well as the failure to
give the clarifying instructions he
had requested. The Fifth Circuit
panel stated that a district court
does not commit a constitutional
violation when it refuses to instruct
the jury of the consequences of failing to reach a unanimous verdict.
The panel conceded that the jury

forms could have confused the jury
but said that such confusion was
cured by the judge's instructions.
In addition, the panel stated that
because the FDPA does not supersede substantive criminal provisions, the district court erred when
it told the jury of the lesser sentence option. However, since Jones
failed to object to the instruction at
trial, the court applied the more difficult "plain error" standard. The
court concluded that since this was
the first case to interpret the FDPA,
the error was not "plain"-in other
words, not "clear or obvious." The
Fifth Circuit also held that the affidavits of two jurors used to establish
jury confusion were barred under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Jones
did not appeal the determination as
to the affidavits.
However, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with Jones that both nonstatutory
aggravating factors regarding
McBride's physical and personal
characteristics were duplicative,
vague, and overbroad. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the
death sentence, finding that the
errors as to these nonstatutory
aggravating factors were harmless.
That is, "the death sentence would
have been imposed beyond a reasonable doubt had the invalid aggravating factors never been submitted
to the jury."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 5, 1998.
CASE ANALYSIS
Jones' arguments with respect to
the jury instructions involve issues
regarding the correct interpretation
of provisions of the FDPA, the
Supreme Court's supervisory role
over the lower federal courts, and
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
In addition, his appeal raises complex issues as to the appropriate
level of review of alleged errors.

Issue No. 5

Essentially, the argument regarding
the jury instructions poses the question of their possible effect in the
following scenario. What if most of
the jurors were in favor of the death
penalty for Jones, but a few were
holding out for a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of
release? That is, if the jurors were
deadlocked and could have reasonably believed that their inability to
come to a unanimous verdict would
have resulted in a court-imposed
sentence less than life without the
possibility of release, the concern is
that the few who were in favor of
life imprisonment might have
changed their vote to death in order
to avoid the judge imposing a less
severe sentence. Jones' argument is
that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the instructions and the verdict
forms caused such jury confusion.
In fact, Jones submitted affidavits
from two jurors confirming that the
jury was confused.
Jones argues that the FDPA requires
appellate review for "passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor"
and that an erroneous interpretation of the jury instructions is such
a factor. This language mirrors that
of the Georgia death penalty statute
approved by the Supreme Court in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). State courts interpreting
similarly worded statutes have held
that the possibility that the jury
misinterpreted the jury instructions
makes the finding by the jury arbitrary. See e.g., State v. Lindsey, 404
So.2d 466 (La. 1981). Given the
possible confusion in this case,
Jones argues that the Supreme
Court should reverse his death sentence even though he made no specific objection to the instructions or
to the language in the verdict forms.
Alternatively, Jones argues that the
Supreme Court should correct the
instructional error based on the
Court's supervisory role over the
lower federal courts.

Jones also makes two constitutional
arguments with respect to the jury
instructions. He argues that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fifth Amendment due
process clause require that juries be
given accurate information during
the sentencing phase to "minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 189.
With respect to the instructions
requested by Jones at trial, his argument centers on an interpretation of
the FDPA. To demonstrate that his
offered instructions correctly stated
the law, Jones asserts that under the
FDPA, if the jury is deadlockedthat is, if it is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to a sentence
of death or of life imprisonmentthe judge is to impose a sentence
authorized by law. Jones points to
the provision quoted above, which
states that the judge is to impose
either life or death as recommended
unanimously by the jury. "Otherwise, the court shall impose any
lesser sentence." In addition, Jones
cites the Judiciary Committee's
Report on the FDPA, which states,
"If the jury is not unanimous, the
judge shall impose the sentence....
Based on this interpretation, Jones
argues that his offered instructions
correctly stated the law and that
they were necessary to ensure that
the jury had accurate sentencing
information and did not speculate
on the effect of a nonunanimous
sentence. Jones argues the trial
court's refusal to give the requested
instructions correcting the error
requires reversal based on essentially the same statutory and constitutional reasons set out above.
The government responds first by
arguing that it is unlikely that the
jury misinterpreted the instructions
of the trial judge in the way Jones

claims. Further, the judge initially
told the jurors that they had to find
unanimously as to one of the three
sentencing options. The mere fact
that the judge did not repeat the
unanimity requirement each time
he referred to "some other lesser
sentence" would not have led the
jury to conclude that a lack of unanimity as to life or death would
have automatically resulted in a less
severe judge-imposed sentence. In
addition, the government claims
that any lack of clarity with respect
to the sentencing forms was cleared
by the same initial instruction that
the jury return a unanimous verdict
as to one of the three options.
The government further argues that
even if there could have been jury
confusion, Jones did not object to
the instructions, and thus the
Supreme Court should not reverse
due to the plain error rule. The purpose of the plain error rule is to
ensure that parties make objections
at trial so that the trial court has an
opportunity to correct any errors. If
a party does not object at trial, he
or she must show that the error was
obvious and that it prejudiced the
party. As to the obviousness of the
error, the government claims that
since there had been no prior interpretation of the FDPA, it was not
clear whether Jones could have
received a lesser sentence under the
Act when this would have conflicted
with the provision requiring a minimum of life for kidnapping resulting
in death.
As to Jones' burden to show prejudice, the government essentially
argues that, in contrast to the hypothetical suggested by Jones' arguments, quite the opposite could
have occurred. That is, the jury
instructions could have benefited
Jones because a majority of jurors
could have been in favor of life, and
the few in favor of death changed
(Continued on Page 276)
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their vote to avoid a less severe sentence imposed by the court. Given
the uncertainty as to the effect of
any error, contends the government,
Jones failed to show prejudice.
As to the statutory bases for review
argued by Jones, the government
claims that erroneous jury instructions do not constitute an "arbitrary
factor," but merely a legal error to
which an objection at trial must be
made.
Finally, as to the instructions
offered by Jones, the government
argues that these do not accurately
state the law. The government
claims that the FDPA clearly states
in one provision that the jury is to
reach a unanimous finding as to one
of the three options-death, life, or
some other lesser sentence. Thus, a
lack of unanimity would not automatically result in a lesser sentence.
Rather, such an occurrence would
simply require a retrial as to
sentencing.
In support of this argument, the
government points to another provision that allows the court to impanel another jury for the sentencing
phase upon determining that "good
cause" exists to discharge the prior
jury. This provision indicates that
Congress intended to accommodate
the general rule that the prosecution may seek a retrial on the sentence if the jury is deadlocked. The
government cited to the statutes of
20 states that expressly provide for
a judge-imposed sentence if the jury
is unable to agree on a sentence of
either life or death and four that
imply such a result. Furthermore,
the government contends that Jones
is not entitled to an instruction
regarding the consequences of a
jury deadlock when there has been
no indication that the jury is in
fact unable to reach a unanimous
verdict.

In his petition before the Supreme
Court, Jones relies on the determination by the Fifth Circuit that the
trial court erred when it allowed the
prosecution to submit two nonstatutory aggravating factors relating to
the personal and physical characteristics of the victim. However, Jones
disputes the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that such error was harmless.
Jones argues that the harmless-error
analysis by the court of appeals was
insufficient and conclusory because
it did not discuss the evidence presented on the aggravating and mitigating factors, the weight the jury
might have given such factors, or
the 11 mitigating factors found by
the jurors. Furthermore, Jones
claims that the government failed to
meet its burden of showing that the
errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government first disputes the
Fifth Circuit's finding that it was
error to submit the two nonstatutory aggravating factors to the jury.
The government argues that the factors relating to the victim's "young
age, slight stature, background, and
unfamiliarity with San Angelo" and
her "personal characteristics and
the effect of the offense on her family" did not give the jury the type of
open-ended discretion invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Second, the government claims that
even if the erroneous aggravating
factors had not been submitted to
the jury, it is beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have still
recommended the death penalty.
The government claims that the
prosecutor relied primarily on the
statutory aggravating factors and
therefore the nonstatutory factors
were not of very much importance.
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SIGNIFICANCE
Most of the arguments in this case
are narrow and factually specific.
The case is nonetheless significant
because it is the first case tried
under the Federal Death Penalty Act
of 1994. The Court might use this
case to shed some light on how it
will interpret certain provisions of
the FDPA. First, the Court may
decide whether the third option of
''some other lesser sentence"
requires jury unanimity. One provision states that unanimity is

required as to all three options.
However, another provision requires
the judge to impose the jury's recommended sentence of either life or
death and then states that
"Otherwise, the court shall impose
any lesser sentence that is authorized by law." This language suggests that the jury's failure to reach
unanimity will result in a default
jury recommendation of "some
other lesser sentence."
Second, the FDPA does not contain
a provision setting out what is to
happen if the jury is deadlocked. If
the FDPA requires jury unanimity
and the jury does not reach a unanimous sentence, does the court
impose a sentence or is there a
retrial on the issue of sentencing?
The government itself cites to at
least 20 jurisdictions that follow
such a procedure rather than
require the judge to order a retrial
on the issue of sentencing.
In addition, this case presents the
Supreme Court with an opportunity
to issue an opinion signed by a
majority of the justices on the question of the effect of the jury's possible consideration of what might
happen to the defendant if the jury
fails to reach a unanimous recommendation of death. In Simmons v.
South Carolina,512 U.S. 154
(1994), the Supreme Court held, in
a plurality opinion, that when a
defendant's future dangerousness is

Issue No. 5

at issue during the penalty phase of
a capital trial, the jury should be
told that the defendant is not eligible for parole under state law. In
Jones, the court told the jury that a
recommendation of life imprisonment meant imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. However,
the judge did not inform the jury
that, given the crime Jones was convicted of-kidnapping resulting in
death-the judge could not impose
"some other lesser sentence"
but could only impose life
imprisonment.
In the Simmons case, four justices
were concerned that the jury was
confused about the meaning of a
term of life imprisonment and that
the trial court's failure to clarify this
put the defendant at a disadvantage.
In another opinion regarding a
denial of a writ of certiorari, four
justices were troubled by a Texas
law that prevents a judge from
telling the jury that the defendant
would not be eligible for parole for
40 years should the jury not sentence the defendant to death.
Brown v. Texas, 118 S.Ct. 354
(1997). In that opinion, Justice
Stevens wrote that such a law "tips
the scales in favor of a death sentence." In addition, such a rule
makes it likely that a jury will speculate erroneously as to what will
happen to the defendant if the jury
fails to sentence him or her to
death. In such a situation, the jury
will likely err on the side of death.
In Jones v. United States, not only
is it likely that the jury erred on the
side of death, but affidavits from two
jurors confirm that this is what
actually happened.
Finally, this is the first case in
which the Supreme Court is asked
to evaluate nonstatutory aggravating
factors for a weighing jurisdiction.
Typically, only aggravating factors
approved by the legislature are used
in death penalty cases. Even where
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such factors have been legislatively
enacted, courts review them to
ensure that the jury's discretion is
guided to avoid arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty. Thus the Court
may indicate the constitutionality of
the specific aggravating circumstances alleged in this case.
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